Quantum Multi Prover Interactive Proofs with Communicating Provers by Ben-Or, Michael et al.
ar
X
iv
:0
80
6.
39
82
v1
  [
qu
an
t-p
h]
  2
4 J
un
 20
08
Quantum Multi Prover Interactive Proofs with Communicating
Provers
Extended Abstract
Michael Ben Or ∗ Avinatan Hassidim † Haran Pilpel ‡
Abstract
Multi Prover Interactive Proof systems (MIPs) were first presented in a cryptographic context,
but ever since they were used in various fields. Understanding the power of MIPs in the quantum
context raises many open problems, as there are several interesting models to consider. For example,
one can study the question when the provers share entanglement or not, and the communication
between the verifier and the provers is quantum or classical. While there are several partial results
on the subject, so far no one presented an efficient scheme for recognizing NEXP (or NP with
logarithmic communication), except for [KM03], in the case there is no entanglement (and of course
no communication between the provers).
We introduce another variant of Quantum MIP, where the provers do not share entanglement,
the communication between the verifier and the provers is quantum, but the provers are unlimited
in the classical communication between them. At first, this model may seem very weak, as provers
who exchange information seem to be equivalent in power to a simple prover. This in fact is not the
case—we show that any language in NEXP can be recognized in this model efficiently, with just two
provers and two rounds of communication, with a constant completeness-soundness gap.
The main idea is not to bound the information the provers exchange with each other, as in the
classical case, but rather to prove that any “cheating” strategy employed by the provers has constant
probability to diminish the entanglement between the verifier and the provers by a constant amount.
Detecting such reduction gives us the soundness proof. Similar ideas and techniques may help help
with other models of Quantum MIP, including the dual question, of non communicating provers
with unlimited entanglement.
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1 Introduction
Multi Prover Interactive Proofs (MIPs) have been studied extensively in the classical setting, and
provide an exact characterization of NEXP [BFL92]. Extending MIPs to the quantum setting poses
many important open problems, and may give us more intuition regarding the power of entanglement.
There are several possible generalizations for quantum multi-prover schemes, which differ in the power
of the verifier (which can be quantum or classical), and in the relation between the provers (for example,
how much entanglement they have). The first results for this problem were given by Kobayashi and
Matsumoto [KM03]. They proved that as long as the provers share a bounded (polynomial) amount of
entanglement, the set of languages which can be recognized is contained in NEXP (even if the verifier
is quantum).
We do not understand the power of the model when the verifier is classical and the provers share
(limited or unlimited) entanglement. In particular, Cleve et al. [CHTW04] provide examples where the
proof is valid if the provers share no entanglement, but is no longer sound when they do. Preda [Pre]
showed that if the provers are not limited to quantum entanglement, but instead have an unlimited
amount of nonlocal boxes [PR97], then the set of recognizable languages is contained in EXP.
There are also some positive results when the provers are quantum. Cleve et al. [CGJ07] provide
a proof system for NP when the verifier is classical and the provers who share an unlimited amount of
entanglement. The proof scheme provides a constant gap, but the communication is linear. Kempe et
al. [KKMTV07] give a quantum protocol for recognizing languages in NP by a quantum verifier with
logarithmic communication, when the provers share unlimited entanglement. However, when x /∈ L the
probability that the verifier will discover this is 1−O(1/n), which means that it is necessary to repeat
the protocol a polynomial number of times to get constant soundness. Ito et al. [IKPSY07] use this
result, and give a 3 prover proof system for NEXP which is resistant to entanglement with soundness
of just 1− 2−poly.
1.1 Our Results
An important assumption underlying the work on multi prover schemes is that the provers are not
allowed to pass information between themselves. The results of [KW00, Pre] could lead us to believe
that a proof system with a quantum verifier and two provers who can pass classical information between
them is limited to EXP. Surprisingly, this is not the case (assuming EXP 6= NEXP). We show that:
Theorem 1.1. Let V be a polynomial time verifier that can exchange quantum messages with two
computationally unbounded provers. The provers share no entanglement, but can freely communicate
classically between them. Then for any L ∈ NEXP there is a two round protocol for the verifier and
provers such that for any string x
• (completeness) If x ∈ L then there are two prover strategies such that V will accept x with
probability 1.
• (soundness) If x /∈ L then for any two prover strategies the probability that V will accept x is at
most c for some constant 0 < c < 1.
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The communication between the verifier and the provers is is polynomial in the length of the input1.
We note that augmenting the provers in our model with unlimited entanglement gives something
which is contained in EXP [KW00] (as this is equivalent to quantum communication and thus to a
single quantum prover). Bounding the verifier to be classical, would limit us to languages in PSPACE
[Sha90] (as in this scenario is equivalent to a single prover and a classical verifier), so both conditions
are necessary. This problem is in a way dual to the scenario where the provers do not have any means
of communication but instead have unlimited entanglement, where much less is known.
QuantumMIPs are thought to be a model of computation which may give us better understanding of
entanglement, and its powers. Surprisingly, our result, which is stated in a model with no entanglement
between the provers, is based on following the entanglement between the provers and the verifier.
Each message the verifier sends is a superposition of two classical queries. Measuring the message
would ruin the superposition, and will be caught by the verifier. However, a strategy which does not
measure it “enough” does not extract enough useful classical information, and prevents the provers from
coordinating answers via the classical channel. Most of the paper follows the amount of entanglement
between the verifier and the provers during the protocol, making sure that either the provers do not
extract enough information to answer with very high probability (we note that from an information-
theoretic point of view they extract many bits of information–so we use tailored bounds), or they have
some chance of getting caught.
1.2 Related Work
It is interesting to view the results of this paper in light of the complexity class QMA(2), defined
by Kobayashi, Mastumoto and Yamakami [KMY01]. Intuitively, this is the class of languages which
can be recognized by a quantum verifier with two unentangled bounded pieces of quantum evidence.
While there is no classical analog for this problem (having two classical witnesses is still NP), there is
evidence that QMA(2) strictly contains QMA [LCV07]. Blier and Tapp [BT07] showed that a verifier
can recognize an NP complete language with soundness 1−O(1/n6). A constant soundness completeness
gap in their results would imply our own. We note however, that Aaronson et al. [ABDFS08] give
evidence towards QMA(2)⊆PSPACE, and therefore we do not expect that this is the case.
The idea of using Private Information Retrieval [CGKS95, KdW03, KdW04] schemes (PIRs) has
been suggested by Cleve et al. [CGJ07]. Our protocol is in a sense a cheat sensitive PIR where
the verifier can check whether the prover has tried to learn information. A similar quantum PIR
scheme has been independently presented by [GLM07] in a different context. It is important to note
that information disturbance tradeoffs proposed by such quantum PIR schemes are by themselves
insufficient to prove the soundness of our multi-prover protocol, since the leakage of even a small
amount of information might enable the provers to succeed in cheating the verifier.
1Equivalently we can state our result for NP, bounding the communication to be logarithmic.
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2 Preliminaries
We assume the reader is familiar with quantum computation (see [NC00] for example).
Let L ∈ NEXP. By standard PCP machinery, we can assume that given x the verifier has an implicit
efficient access to an exponentially long 3-SAT formula Φ, such that if x ∈ L then Φ is satisfiable, and
otherwise any assignment can satisfy at most a 1−γ proportion of the clauses for some constant γ > 0.
We can also assume that each variable appears exactly 5 times, and each clause contains three different
variables. Let C denote the set of clauses and V the set of variables. If a variable v ∈ V appears in a
clause c ∈ C we write v ∈ c. Let M = |C| denote the number of clauses and N = |V | the number of
variables. Let T be a truth assignment for Φ. For a variable x ∈ V , let T (x) denote the value T assigns
x. For a clause y ∈ C, if y contains the variables vy1 , vy2 , vy3 , let T (y) = T (vy1), T (vy2 ), T (vy3).
Alice (Bob) has a private Hilbert space HpA (H
p
B), with some finite arbitrarily large dimension d (we
assume without loss of generality that the dimensions are identical). The messages between Alice (Bob)
and the verifier will be sent by passing a state which is in a Hilbert space HmA (H
m
B ). For convenience,
we partition the private Hilbert space of the verifier into three parts, Hv = H
aux
v ⊗ HvA ⊗ HvB. The
Hilbert spaces HvA,H
v
B will be used with messages sent to different provers, but they are private spaces
that belong to the verifier. We let the verifier send and receive classical messages from Alice2. For the
protocol we present, the dimensions of the Hilbert spaces used are dim(HmA ) = 8M , which would fit
a clause y and T (y), dim(HvA) = M , dim(H
m
B ) = 2N which would fit a variable and the value it is
assigned, and dim(HvB) = N .
3 Algorithm
Let π be a probability distribution which chooses two clauses y, y˜ uniformly at random from C, and
two variables x, x˜ uniformly at random from V , with the constraint that x appears in y (x˜ does not
necessarily appear in y˜).
Protocol for verifier
1. Sample π to get y, y˜, x, x˜. Generate the states on O(log(N)) qubits
1√
2
(|yy〉+ |y˜y˜〉)⊗ |000〉 ∈ HvA ⊗HmA
1√
2
(|xx〉+ |x˜x˜〉)⊗ |0〉 ∈ HvB ⊗HmB
Send Alice (Bob) the message space HmA (H
m
B ), which consists of the last m+ 3 (n+ 1) qubits.
2. Let T be a satisfying assignment for Φ (if one exists). Alice should apply the unitary which takes
|c〉 ⊗ |000〉 → |c〉 ⊗ |T (c)〉 for any clause c ∈ C, and Bob should apply the unitary which takes
2This can be done by using a larger space HmA , with the verifier measuring the part of the space which should be used
for the classical message. Thus, this does not change the model, and is only done for clarity.
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|v〉 ⊗ |0〉 → |v〉|T (v)〉 for v ∈ V . In fact the provers apply any Local Operations and Classical
Communication protocol they want among themselves. Finally, Alice (Bob) returns the verifier
the message space HmA (H
m
B ).
3. Send Alice the classical values y, y˜, x, x˜. Alice returns 8 bits: T (y), T (y˜), T (x), T (x˜). If Alice
returned quantum values, the verifier measures them according to the standard basis.
4. Verify that the clause y is satisfied, and that T (x) matches T (y). Perform the SWAP test
[BCWW01] between the state in HvA⊗HmA and 1√2(|yy〉⊗ |T (y)〉+ |y˜y˜〉⊗ |T (y˜)〉 and between the
state in HvB ⊗HmB and 1√2 (|xx〉 ⊗ |T (x)〉+ |x˜x˜〉 ⊗ |T (x˜)〉. Accept if all tests passed.
Note that the verifier does not generate any entanglement between the provers. This means that it is
possible to repeat the protocol in order to reduce the error probability.
Completeness: With a common satisfying assignment the provers can apply the required quantum
transformation, and all the tests will be passed with probability 1.
4 Soundness of the Protocol
Intuition To simplify the analysis, we modify the protocol. First, we purify the verifier. This will
enable us to talk about the probability of a set of queries given measurements by the provers. The
second modification will be to strengthen the provers, allowing them to perform any joint separable
measurement instead of Local Operations and Classical Communication (LOCC), which will enable us
to write the state after their actions. We prove that the provers have a constant failure probability
for any result k of the separable measurement they make. We begin by finding an estimate for the
probability that the verifier measures (y, y˜, x, x˜) as a function of the provers’ result k. Next, we show
that if k is more probable given a clause y1 then given another result y2, and the verifier measured
(y1, y2, x, x˜) for any x, x˜, then there is constant probability that Alice fails the SWAP test (because
such a measurement operator diminishes the entanglement between HvA and H
m
A ).
We then show that either the measurement has a constant probability to diminish the entanglement,
or after it there is still a large set of clauses (and variables which appear in them) which are all “almost
uniformly” probable. The set will be large enough that no assignment will satisfy all of it. This
means that if the provers succeed with very high (but constant) probability, they must succeed on a
large portion of this “uniform” set, and thus they must succeed on a very large number of clauses and
variables. This will give a strategy for the classical protocol which has success probability greater then
1− γ/3, which is a contradiction.
The Modified Protocol As stated above, the first modification is to purify the sampling of π,
postponing it until after the provers act on the information. It uses Hauxv with dim(H
aux
v ) = M
2N2.
The verifier generates
ψπ =
∑
y,y˜∈C
∑
x∈y
∑
x˜∈V
|yy˜, xx˜〉⊗ 1√
2
(|yy〉+|y˜y˜〉)⊗|000〉⊗ 1√
2
(|xx〉+|x˜x˜〉)⊗|0〉 ∈ Hauxv ⊗HAv ⊗HAm⊗HBv ⊗HBm
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As before, the verifier sends Alice (Bob) the Hilbert space HAm (H
B
m). After Alice and Bob act on the
message spaces they get and return HAm,H
B
m, the verifier measures H
aux
v to get y, y˜, x, x˜ and sends them
to Alice as in Protocol 1. This modification does not change the cheating power of the provers (they
cannot tell what protocol is being used).
The second modification is to replace the LOCC done by the provers in the first stage with a single
joint separable measurement. [BDF+98, BNS97] proved that this is strictly stronger than LOCC. In
particular they showed how to transform any LOCC protocol into such a measurement. As the provers
are not entangled, we can assume that their private spaces are initialized with the state |0 . . . 0〉. Letting
ρ = |ψπ〉〈ψπ|, the provers’ operation now becomes applying a measurement with operators
(IM2N2 ⊗ IM ⊗Ak ⊗ IN ⊗Bk)†(IM2N2 ⊗ IM ⊗Ak ⊗ IN ⊗Bk)
where Ip is the p× p identity matrix, Ak is an 8Md× 8Md matrix, Bk is a 2Nd× 2Nd matrix and∑
k
(Ak ⊗Bk)†(Ak ⊗Bk) = I16NMd2
The Hilbert spaces HAm,H
B
m are then returned to the verifier.
We now calculate the probability that the verifier measured values r = (y, y˜, x, x˜), conditioned
on the fact that the measurement result was k. Denote Ak(y) = tr(Ak(|y〉〈y| ⊗ I)Ak), where we are
tracing over the private qubits of the prover and the qubits which define the assignment, and similarly
Bk(x) = tr(Bk(|x〉〈x| ⊗ I)xk). In Appendix A, we prove that for y 6= y˜, x 6= x˜
Pr(y, y˜, x, x˜|k) = (A(y) +A(y˜))(B(x) +B(x˜))∑
c,c˜∈C,v∈c,v˜∈V Pr(c, c˜, v, v˜|k)
(1)
where if y = y˜ the numerator changes to 4A(y)(B(x) +B(x˜)), and similarly for x, x˜.
We give some intuition for Equation (1). The numerator is the product of two factors, because when
the verifier measures before the provers (which is physically equivalent) the provers are unentangled,
and therefore the probability of k is just the tr(AkρA
†
k) · tr(BkρB†k). Alice’s factor is composed of two
terms, because tracing out the verifier Alice just gets a mixed state of 12 |y〉〈y|+ 12 |y˜〉〈y˜|.
Omitting the subindex k, and denoting WAk =
∑
iAk(i) = tr(Ak),WBk =
∑
iBk(i) = tr(Bk), W˜ =
Σc∈C,v∈cAk(c)Bk(v) We show the following bound in In Appendix A, by bounding the denominator
Pr(y, y˜, x, x˜|k) ≥ A(y)B(x) +A(y)B(x˜) +A(y˜)B(x) +A(y˜)B(x˜)
2MNW˜ + 22MWAWB
(2)
4.1 Auxiliary Lemmas
We show that if Ak is too skewed, then for certain values of y, y˜, Alice has a good chance of failing the
SWAP test. Formally:
Lemma 4.1. Assume A(y) ≥ pA(y˜), p > 1. Then for any assignment T , the probability that the
verifier will catch Alice cheating in the SWAP test is at least 12 −
√
p
1+p .
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The proof is found in Appendix B, as it is somewhat technical. The intuition is that the super-
operator which acts on the state diminishes the entanglement between HvA and H
m
A . Therefore, this is
true for any assignment Alice will send in the second round of the protocol.
If the condition of lemma 4.1 holds, we say that the measurement p-damaged the state. An analogous
lemma holds for Bob. The following lemma is trivial:
Lemma 4.2. If there exists a set D ⊂ Y × Y˜ ×X × X˜ such that
1. For any d = (y, y˜, x, x˜) ∈ D we have x ∈ y, and either A or B p-damage d for some constant p.
2.
∑
d∈D Pr(d|k) > ǫD for some constant ǫD
Then at least one of the provers gets caught in the SWAP test with probability ǫD
(
1
2 −
√
p
1+p
)
.
In this case we say that D is an (ǫD, p) bad set.
4.2 Large NMW˜
Theorem 4.3. If NMW˜ ≥ 100MWAWB then at least one of the provers fails the SWAP test with
probability 1
6.96·109 = min
{
1
6.96·109 ,
1
4.2·107
}
.
The proof is by contradiction. We prove Lemma 4.4, which states that if A and B do not have a
certain property then the provers have a constant probability of getting caught. We then prove that if A
and B do have that property than either a second property holds or the provers get caught, with some
probability. The second property implies NMW˜ < 100MWAWB, which is a contradiction. Remember
W˜ =
∑
c∈C.v∈cA(c)B(v). For c ∈ C, let u(c) = Σv∈cA(c)B(v), and for S ⊂ C, U(S) =
∑
c∈S u(c). Let
Si =
{
c :
W˜
2i+1
< u(c) ≤ W˜
2i
}
Lemma 4.4. If there exists an index j such that
∑j−1
i=0 U(Si) > W˜/100 and
∑∞
i=j+1 U(Si) > W˜/100,
then the provers get caught with constant probability 1
6.96·109 , generated from a (
1
4.8·107 ,
√
2) bad set.
The proof is found in Appendix C. It follows by constructing a bad set, such that the clauses
(and variables) in ∪j−1i=0Si stand for y, x, and the clauses (and variables) in ∪∞i=j+1Si stand for y˜, x˜,
where we use the fact that if u(c1) > 2u(c2) for some two clauses, then either Alice damages the
state because A(c1) >
√
2A(c2), or Bob
√
2 damages the state, or both of them do. We note that if
u(c1) > 2u(c2), u(c1) > 2u(c3) it may still be the case that A(c2) > A(c1), and for each v3 ∈ c3 and
each v1 ∈ c1 B(v3) > B(v1). However, taking out such tuples only diminishes the size of the bad set D
by a factor of 36 (a factor of 9 comes from choosing one of the variables in the clause, and a factor of
4 comes from choosing the clause).
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If the condition of Lemma 4.4 does not hold, then there must be an index j such that U(Sj) +
U(Sj+1) > 0.98W˜ . Define F = Sj ∪ Sj+1. Remembering that WA =
∑
c∈C A(c), we partition the
clauses in F :
Ti = {c ∈ F : WA
2i+1
< A(c) ≤ WA
2i
}
Lemma 4.5. If there exists an index j such that
∑j−1
i=0 |Ti| > |F |/100, and
∑∞
i=j+1 |Ti| > |F |/100, then
the first prover gets caught with constant probability 1
4.2·107 , generated from a (
1
1.2·106 , 2) bad set.
The proof appears in Appendix C. It is very similar to the one of Lemma 4.4, but much simpler.
As before, if the condition of Lemmas 4.4 and 4.5 do not hold, then
∃i : |Ti|+ |Ti+1| > 0.98|F | ≥ 0.982M > 0.96M
Let G = Ti ∪ Ti+1. As G ⊂ F , and as ∀c1, c2 ∈ F : u(c1) < 4u(c2) we have
U(G) > 0.25 · 0.98U(F ) > 0.25 · 0.982W˜ (3)
Note
∑
c∈G
∑
v∈cB(v) ≤ 5WB , as each variable appears 5 times. Also, since ∀c ∈ G : A(c) > WA/2i+1
0.96M
WA
2i+1
<
WA
2i+1
|G| <
∑
c∈G
A(c) < WA (4)
Putting this together, we get
0.25 · 0.982W˜ (3)< U(G) =
∑
c∈G
u(c) =
∑
c∈G
∑
v∈c
A[c]B[v] ≤
∑
c∈G
∑
v∈c
WA
2i−1
B[v] =
4WA
2i+1
∑
c∈G
∑
v∈c
B[v] ≤ 20WAWB
2i+1
(4)
≤ 20WAWB
0.96M
≤ 20WAWB
0.96N
This is a contradiction to MNW˜ ≥ 100MWAWB. This proves Theorem 4.3.
4.3 Small NMW˜
In this subsection we handle those values of k for which the premise of Theorem 4.3 does not hold,
i.e., NMW˜ < 100MWAWB . Define Si = {c ∈ C : WA2i+1 ≤ A(c) < WA2i }. For a set S ⊂ C, let
W (S) = Σc∈SA(c).
Lemma 4.6. If NMW˜ < 100MWAWB and there exists an index i such that
i−1∑
j=0
W (Sj) > γ10
−4WA
∧ ∞∑
j=i+1
|Sj | > γ10−4M (5)
then Alice is caught cheating with probability γ
2
2.6·1012 , generated from a (
γ2
7.4·1010 , 2) bad set.
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The proof is found in Appendix D. It is very similar to that of Lemma 4.5.
Lemma 4.7. If NMW˜ < 100MWAWB and the second condition of Lemma 4.6 does not hold, then
there exists an index i such that for F = Si ∪ Si+1 we have
|F | ≥ (1− 0.0002γ)M
∧
W (F ) ≥ (1− 0.0002γ)WA
∧
∀c ∈ F : A(c) ≥ WA
5M
Again the proof is found in Appendix D. Using B instead of A, we define the sets Ti analogously to
Si: Ti =
{
v ∈ V : WB
2i+1
≤ B(v) < WB
2i
}
Lemma 4.8. Either Bob gets caught cheating with probability γ
2
3.9·1012 which is generated from a
γ2
1.1·1011 , 2
bad set, or else there exists an index i such that for G = Ti ∪ Ti+1 we have |G| > (1 − 0.0002γ)N ,
Σv∈GB(v) ≥ (1− 0.0002γ)WB and for each v ∈ G, B(v) ≥ WB5N .
The proof is very similar to the argument for Alice. It is found in Appendix D
Let H = {c ∈ F : ∀v ∈ c, v ∈ G}. As |G| ≥ (1 − 0.0002γ)N , and each variable appears 5 times
we have |H| ≥ (1 − 0.0002γ)M − 5 · 0.0002γN ≥ (1 − 0.002γ)M . We now prove that a good success
probability for Alice and Bob implies a good success probability for the provers in the classical game,
with no communication. As the classical success probability is bounded, this will give a bound for the
quantum success probability. Before we begin, we go over the classical setting.
4.3.1 Classical Setting
Let Charlie and Diana be two classical provers who are faced with a classical verifier. The verifier sends
Charlie a random clause c, and Diana a random variable v which appears in c. Charlie should answer
with the values that some satisfying assignment gives the variables in c, and Diana should answer with
the value that same assignment gives v. If the original formula is γ-distant from being satisfiable, then
the success probability of Charlie and Diana is bounded by 1− γ3 .
We prove a reduction from the quantum case to the classical one. First, a simple lemma.
Lemma 4.9. If 〈u|v〉 ≤ 1/2 and |u| = |v| = |w| = 1 then 〈u|w〉 > 1− ǫ⇒ 〈v|w〉 < 1/2 +
√
3ǫ
2 − ǫ2 .
The proof follows from Taylor’s approximation. A specific case: if ǫ < 0.01 then the final term is less
than 0.99. Finally, let FailProb(y, y˜, x, x˜, k) denote the probability that the provers failed to convince
the verifier, given the measurement results (y, y˜, x, x˜) and k.
Lemma 4.10. If there exists an index k, matrices Ak, Bk and a set of clauses R ⊂ C such that
1. |R| ≥ (1− ǫ1)M
2. ∀y ∈ R : ∀x ∈ y : |{(y˜, x˜) ∈ C × V : FailProb(y, y˜, x, x˜, k) > ǫ3}| < ǫ2MN
3. ǫ3 < 1/200
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then there is a classical strategy for Charlie and Diana which gives them a success probability of at least
(1− ǫ1)(1− ǫ2)(1− ǫ3)(1 − 200ǫ3)2.
Proof. Charlie gets as an input a clause y from the verifier. He chooses a random y˜, and simulates
Alice, conjugating by Ak. Then he finds the closest possible legal classical description to the state, by
choosing T (y), T (y˜) to maximize the fidelity. Similarly, Diane simulates Bob with her input x.
The classical verifier chooses independently, and therefore with probability at least 1−ǫ1 he chooses
a clause from R. With probability greater than 1 − ǫ2 the provers choose a pair y˜, x˜ for which Alice
and Bob have good success probability. If this is the case, Alice and Bob’s success probability is at
least 1 − ǫ3. Since Alice passes the SWAP test with probability 1 − ǫ3, the state she sends in the
first step must pass the SWAP test with the classical description she sent in the second step with
probability 1 − ǫ3. If the latter is not the closest possible classical description, then her probability
of failing the SWAP test, using δ = 0.99 to ensure that there are no closer alternatives, is at least
(1 − δ2)/2 > (1 − 0.992)/2 > 1/200. Thus, the probability that this occurs is bounded by 200ǫ3. So
with probability at least 1−200ǫ3 Alice and Charlie send the same assignment; given that, there is only
an ǫ3 chance of failure for Charlie. Finally, the same argument as before applies to Diane (simulating
Bob), which contributes another factor of 1 − 200ǫ3 (the other factors have already been counted for
both provers).
Lemma 4.11. If the failure probability of Alice and Bob given result k is less than γ
3
5.55·1013 then there
exists a set R with the properties stated in Lemma 4.10, with ǫ1 = 0.003γ, ǫ2 = γ10
−3 and ǫ3 = γ10−4.
Proof. Since the failure probability is less than 1
6.96·109 , we must have, by Theorem 4.3, that NMW˜ <
100MWAWB . By Lemmas 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8, we have a set H such that |H| ≥ (1− 0.002γ)M , and
∀y ∈ H : ∀x ∈ y : A(y) > WA/(5M) ∧B(x) > WB/(5N)
Using (2), this means that for any tuple (y, y˜, x, x˜) ∈ H
Pr(y, y˜, x x˜|k) ≥ A(y)B(x)
222MWAWB
≥ WAWB
25MN · 222MWAWB =
1
5.55 · 103NM2
Denote L(y, x) = {(y˜, x˜) : FailProb(y, y˜, x, x˜, k) > 10−4γ}, and Hfail = {y ∈ H : ∃x ∈ y : |L(y, x)| >
10−3γNM}. For any clause y ∈ Hfail, let fail(y) ∈ y denote the variable in y for which L(y, x) is
maximal. We bound Alice and Bob’s failure probability from below, to get an upper bound on |Hfail|
Pr(Provers fail to cheat) ≥
∑
y∈Hfail,x∈y
∑
(y˜,x˜)∈L(y,x)
FailProb(y, y˜, x, x˜, k) Pr(y, y˜, x, x˜|k)
≥
∑
y∈Hfail
∑
(y˜,x˜)∈L(y,x)
γ10−4 Pr(y, y˜, fail(y), x˜ : k)
≥
∑
y∈Hfail
γ10−4|L(y, fail(y))|Pr(y, y˜, fail(y), x˜ : k)
≥
∑
y∈Hfail
γ2NMWAWB
25NM · 107 · 222MWAWB =
γ2|Hfail|
M · 5.55 · 1010
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Where the last inequality comes from taking a tuple in H. As Pr(The provers fail) < γ
3
5.55·1013 , we have
|Hfail| < γ
3
5.55 · 1013 ·
M · 5.55 · 1010
γ2
= 10−3γM
Taking R = H\Hfail, we get |R| ≥ (1− 0.002γ)M − |Hfail| ≥ (1− 0.003γ)M as required.
Proof of theorem 1.1. Assume Φ is not satisfiable, and assume by contradiction that the provers
had some strategy which would work with success probability ≥ 1 − γ35.55·1013 . Then there has to be
a measurement result k such that the success probability given k is at least 1 − γ3
5.55·1013 . However,
according to the previous lemma, either the provers are caught with probability greater than γ
3
5.55·1013
(which contradicts our assumption on the success probability), or there exists a set R as in the premises
of that lemma. However, this would imply that there is a strategy in the classical protocol with success
probability > (1− 0.003γ)(1 − γ10−3)(1− γ10−4)(1− 200γ10−4)2 > 1− γ/3, which is a contradiction.
5 Conclusions and Open Problems
We have shown that NEXP can be recognized in a quantum MIP protocol, even if the provers have
unlimited classical communication between them. Our protocol achieves perfect completeness and a
constant gap. It only sends O(log(N)) qubits, and thus can also be used for NP-complete languages
with a polylogarithmic communication. Some interesting questions still remain open:
• What is the correct upper bound on the power of this proof system? Note that if the provers
were allowed to make any joint separable measurement it would be exactly NEXP. Does adding
provers or communication rounds help? What happens if there is just one quantum round?
• Is there a parallel repetition lemma for protocols when the provers are allowed to communicate
with each other? The original proof of [Raz95] does not apply here.
• What happens in the dual problem, when the provers are allowed to share entanglement but are
not allowed to communicate? Does our protocol still work, with a different proof?
• Does our result hold when the provers have a bounded amount of entanglement in addition to
their communication channel?
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A Calculating Probabilities
Let r = (y, y˜, x, x˜). We wish to estimate Pr(r|k). Bayes’ rule gives
Pr(r|k) = Pr(k|r) Pr(r)
Pr(k)
=
Pr(k|r) Pr(r)∑
s Pr(k|s) Pr(s)
where s denotes any legal tuple s = (c, c˜, v, v˜) with c, c˜ ∈ C, v, v˜ ∈ V and v ∈ c. As the prior
distribution for all legal tuples is identical, we are only interested in calculating Pr(k|s) for any legal
tuple s = (c, c˜, v, v˜).
In the protocol we presented, the provers first apply their measurement and get k, and then the
verifier measures to get s. However, it is physically equivalent to assume the verifier measured first. As
the states sent to the provers are unentangled after tracing out the verifier, we have that
Pr(k|s) = tr((I ⊗Ak)ρA(I ⊗Ak)†) · tr((I ⊗Bk)ρB(I ⊗Bk)†)
Where ρA is the state in H
v
A⊗HMA , ρB is the state in HvB ⊗HMB , and the identity is applied on the
verifier’s side.
When considering states in HvA⊗HmA ⊗HpA, we stick to the convention that the first m qubits define
the verifier’s private space, then next m+ 3 describe the message qubits, and the last d define Alice’s
private space. We can now calculate
Ak(y) = tr(Ak(|y〉〈y| ⊗ I)Ak) =
8Md∑
j=1
8Dy∑
h=8d(y−1)+1
Ak[j, h]Ak [j, h] =
8Md∑
j=1
8Di∑
h=8d(y−1)+1
|Ak[j, h]|2
Bk(x) = tr(Bk(|x〉〈x| ⊗ I)Bk) =
2Nd∑
j=1
2dx∑
h=2d(x−1)+1
Bk[j, h]Bk [j, h] =
2Nd∑
j=1
2di∑
h=2d(x−1)+1
|Bk[j, h]|2
We now assume that the x, x˜ is being traced out, and only look at the probabilities for y, y˜, generated
from tr((I ⊗Ak)ρA(I ⊗Ak)†). As Ak(y) is just the trace out of the private data and the qubits which
fit the assignment, then Ak(y) = tr((I ⊗Ak)ρA(I ⊗Ak)†). We are analyzing the following expression:
tr(IM ⊗A8MdρA(IM ⊗A8Md)†)
Up to normalization, ρA is a matrix which contains exactly four 1s, arranged: (a, a), (a, b), (b, a), (b, b).
However, as we shall soon see, either a = b (in which case we have a single cell with a 4 in it) or else
|a − b| ≥ 8Md and thus, by the previous paragraph, we can ignore the off-diagonal entries. In both
cases we can restrict our attention to the diagonal entries.
Thus the structure of the ρA matrix is:
ρ =
1√
2
(|yy〉+ |y˜y˜〉)⊗ |000〉〈000|(〈yy| + 〈y˜y˜|) 1√
2
⊗ |0d〉〈0d| ∈ HAv ⊗HAM ⊗HAp
3
Note that the term 0d refers to element in a space of dimension d, as opposed to 000, an element in a
space of dimension 23. If y = y˜ then obviously there is only one nonzero cell in the final matrix, on
the diagonal. Otherwise, since |yy〉 is located in the cell My + y = (M + 1)y, and y˜ 6= y, they are
differentiated (after tensoring) by at least (M + 1) · 8 · d > 8Md, as required.
Let Ak(i) =
∑8Md
j=1
∑8Di
h=8d(i−1)+1 Ak[j, h]Ak[j, h] =
∑8Md
j=1
∑8Di
h=8d(i−1)+1 |Ak[j, h]|2. The probability
that the verifier measures y, y˜ in the modified protocol given k is
P (y, y˜|k) = P (k|y, y˜)P (y, y˜)
P (k)
=
P (k|y, y˜)P (y, y˜)∑
z,z˜ P (k|z, z˜)P (z, z˜)
=
tr(Akρy,y˜A
†
k)∑
z,z˜ tr(Akρz,z˜A
†
k)
(equal unless y = y˜) ≥ Ak(y) +Ak(y˜)∑
z 6=z˜(Ak(z) +Ak(z˜)) +
∑
z 4Ak(z)
=
Ak(y) +Ak(y˜)∑
z,z˜(Ak(z) +Ak(z˜)) +
∑
z 2Ak(z)
=
Ak(y) +Ak(y˜)
2MWAk + 2WAk
where WAk is the total weight: WAk =
∑
z Ak(z). Note that if y = y˜ we use 4Ak(y) instead of
Ak(y) +Ak(y˜).
A.1 Bounding the Denominator
Let WAk =
∑
iAk(i),WBk =
∑
iBk(i), W˜ = Σc∈C,v∈cAk(c)Bk(v). We want to bound the denominator
in
Pr(y, y˜, x, x˜|k) = (A(y) +A(y˜))(B(x) +B(x˜))∑
c,c˜∈C,v∈c,v˜∈V Pr(c, c˜, v, v˜|k)
Note that if c = c˜, then tr((I ⊗ Ak)ρA(I ⊗ Ak)†) = 4Ak(c). However, when c 6= c˜, we account this
twice (because any of them can be considered first in the sum). Thus, the denominator becomes
∑
c,c˜
∑
v∈c,v˜
(Ak(c) +Ak(c˜))(Bk(v) +Bk(v˜)) + 2

 ∑
c=c˜,v,v˜
+
∑
c,c˜,v=v˜

+ 4 ∑
c=c˜,v=v˜
(6)
where all the sums are on (Ak(c)+Ak(c˜))(Bk(v)+Bk(v˜)), and factors of two and four come from c = c˜,
and v = v˜. We begin by bounding the first two sums (which will contribute most of the weight). We
omit the subindex k.
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∑
c,c˜
∑
v∈c,v˜
(A(c) +A(c˜))(B(v) +B(v˜)) =
∑
c,c˜
∑
v∈c,v˜
A(c)B(v) +A(c)B(v˜) +A(c˜)B(v) +A(c˜)B(v˜)
We now look at each of the four terms separately:
∑
c,c˜
∑
v∈c,v˜
A(c)B(v) =MN
∑
v∈c,v˜
A(c)B(v)MNW˜
∑
c,c˜
∑
v∈c,v˜
A(c)B(v˜) = 3M
∑
c∈C,v˜∈V
A(c)B(v˜) = 3MWAWB
∑
c,c˜
∑
v∈c,v˜
A(c˜)B(v) = 5NWAWB < 5MWAWB
And
∑
c,c˜
∑
v∈c,v˜ A(c˜)B(v˜) = 3MWAWB. We used the fact that Φ is 3− SAT , and that each variable
appears exactly 5 times.
We return to bounding the sums in (6). By fixing c, we get that if c = c˜ the second sum is bounded,
relative to the first, by a factor of 2/M . Fixing v˜, we can bound the third sum by a factor of 2/N .
Fixing both, the fourth sum is bounded by a factor of 4/(MN). We get an overall bound for the
denominator of:
(MNW˜ + 3MWAWB + 5NWAWB + 3MWAWB)(1 + 2/M + 2/N + 4/(MN))
Since M and N are arbitrarily large, and M ≥ N , we deduce our bound:
2(MNW˜ + 11MWAWB)
which finally gives
Pr(y, y˜, x, x˜|k) ≥ A(y)B(x) +A(y)B(x˜) +A(y˜)B(x) +A(y˜)B(x˜)
2MNW˜ + 22MWAWB
B Proof of Lemma 4.1
Lemma 4.1 Assume A(y) ≥ pA(y˜), p > 1. Then for any assignment T , the probability that the verifier
will catch Alice cheating in the SWAP test is at least 12 −
√
p
1+p .
Proof. Let σ = trHp
A
(I⊗Ak)ρ(I⊗Ak)†
tr((I⊗Ak)ρ(I⊗Ak)†) , and |ψ〉 = 1/
√
2(|yy〉|T (y)〉+ |y˜y˜〉|T (y˜)〉). Taking δ =
√
〈ψ|σ|ψ〉
the fidelity between |ψ〉 and ρ, the SWAP test has probability at least 1−δ22 to distinguish between them
[BCWW01].
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To calculate σ, we utilize the result in Appendix A. Since ρ consists of four elements in a rectangle
((8M + 8)y, (8M + 8)y), ((8M + 8)y, (8M + 8)y˜), ((8M + 8)y˜, (8M + 8)y), ((8M + 8)y˜, (8M + 8)y˜),
differentiated by a distance of at least 8M , the nondiagonal elements do not contribute to the trace.
For a given assignment T (y) ∈ {0, 1}3 and T (y˜) ∈ {0, 1}3, let |ψ〉 = 1/√2(|yy〉|T (y)〉 + |y˜y˜〉|T (y˜)〉).
The fidelity between the pure state ψ and the quantum state is
√
〈ψ|σ|ψ〉.
|ψ〉 is an equal superposition of two base vectors, one corresponding to the base state |yyT (y)〉 and
the other to |y˜y˜T (y˜)〉. Thus the multiplication is effectively the sum of four elements arranged in a
rectangle (multiplied by 1/2). To calculate each of these four elements, we turn to Appendix A. Since,
in the tensor product I ⊗ Ak, any cell whose two coordinates differ by at least 8M is zero, we can
simplify and get:
σ[yyT (y), yyT (y)] = tr(A|yT (y)〉〈yT (y)|A)
σ[yyT (y), y˜y˜T (y˜)] = tr(A|yT (y)〉〈y˜T (y˜)|A)
We write the elements, sticking to the convention that the first m qubits describe the verifier’s
private space, the next m fit the clause in the message space and the last three fit the value of the
assignment:
σ(8My + 8y + a, 8My + 8y + a) =
d∑
i=1
d∑
j=1
|A[8dy + da+ i, 8dy + da+ j]|2
σ((8M + 8)y˜ + b, (8M + 8)y˜ + b) =
∑
i
∑
j
|A[8dy˜ + db+ i, 8dy˜ + db+ j]|2
σ((8M + 8)y + a, (8M + 8)y˜ + b) =
∑
i
∑
j
A[8dy + da+ i, 8dy + da+ j]A[8dy˜ + db+ i, 8dy˜ + db+ j]
σ((8M + 8)y˜ + b, (8M + 8)y + a) =
∑
i
∑
j
A[8dy˜ + db+ i, 8dy˜ + db+ j]A[8dy + da+ i, 8dy + da+ j]
Note that as AA† is a measurement operator, we have that A(y) ≤ 1, so A(y˜) ≤ 1/p. Now calculating,
reindexing by s = 8My+8y+T (y) and t = 8My˜+8y˜+T (y˜), and folding the sum into the expression,
we get:
|σ[s, s]|2 + |σ[t, t]|2 + σ[s, t]σ[t, s] + σ[t, s]σ[s, t]
2(A(y) +A(y˜))
≤ A(y) +A(y˜) + 2
√
A(y)A(y˜)
2(A(y) +A(y˜))
=
1
2
+
√
A(y)A(y˜)
A(y) +A(y˜)
< 1
The last inequality follows from the AM-GM inequality. More precisely, since the ratio is at least p, the
extreme value is achieved when it is exactly p, which (when substituting) gives what we need. When
p ≥ √2, this gives 1/2+21/4/(1+√2) ≤ 0.993, as required. When p ≥ 2, we get 1/2−√2/3 ≤ 0.975.
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C Proofs for Lemmas 4.4 and 4.5
Remember that for c ∈ C, u(c) = Σv∈cA(c)B(v), and for S ⊂ C, U(S) =
∑
c∈S u(c). We also defined
Si =
{
c :
W˜
2i+1
< u(c) ≤ W˜
2i
}
Lemma 4.4. If there exists an index j such that
∑j−1
i=0 U(Si) > W˜/100 and
∑∞
i=j+1 U(Si) > W˜/100,
then the provers get caught with constant probability 16.96·109 , generated from a (
1
4.8·107 ,
√
2) bad set.
Proof. We construct such a bad set D. For any clause c in variables v1, v2, v3, let vmax(c) denote the
variable vi ∈ c such that B[vi] = max{B[vj ] : j = 1, 2, 3}, and define vmin(c) analogously. Let Sup =
∪j−1i=0Si, and Sdown = ∪∞i=j+1Si. As U(Sdown) > W˜/100, and Sdown consists of “light” clauses, we must
have |Sdown| > M/100. Partition Sdown arbitrarily into two sets Sl and Sr, such that |Sl|, |Sr| ≥M/200.
The idea is that each clause in Sup will contribute |Sl| · |Sr| elements to D.
For each cup ∈ Sup, cl ∈ Sl, cr ∈ Sr, we have u(cup) > 2u(cl), u(cup) > 2u(cr). Taking the maximal
element in the sum for cup, and the minimal element for cl, cr, we get:
A(cup)B(vmax(cup)) > 2A(cl)B(vmin(cl))
A(cup)B(vmax(cup)) > 2A(cr)B(vmin(cr))
Assume WLOG that A(cl) < A(cr). Then
A(cup)B(vmax(cup)) > 2A(cl)B(vmin(cr))
So in the tuple (cup, cl, vmax(cup), vmin(cr)) at least one of the provers damages the state by at least√
2. We add this tuple to D. Note that we have added a (distinct) element to D for each of the |Sl| · |Sr|
choices of cl, cr, as desired. Let Dup denote the elements contributed to D by cup.
The next step is to prove that D has constant probability. Note that under the conditions of the
lemma, we have ∑
y,y˜∈C,x∈y,x˜∈V
Pr(y, y˜, x, x˜|k) < 22MWAWB + 2NMW˜ < 4NMW˜
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∑
(y,y˜,x,x˜)∈D
Pr((y, y˜, x, x˜) : k) =
∑
cup
∑
(y˜,x˜)∈D(cups)
Pr((cup, y˜,max(cup), x˜) : k)
≥ 1
4NMW˜
∑
cup
∑
(y˜,x˜)∈D(cup)
A(cup)B(max(cup))
≥ 1
4NMW˜
|Sl| · |Sr|
∑
cup
A(cup)B(max(cup))
≥ 1
4NMW˜
|Sl| · |Sr|
∑
cup
u(cup)/3
≥ 1
4NMW˜
|Sl| · |Sr|W˜/300
≥ 1
4NMW˜
· M
200
· M
200
· W˜
300
(because M > N) >
NMW˜
4NMW˜ · 200 · 200 · 300
=
1
4.8 · 107
Remember that F = Sj ∪ Sj+1 and Ti = {c ∈ F : WA2i+1 < A(c) ≤ WA2i }. We wish to prove
Lemma 4.5. If there exists an index j such that
∑j−1
i=0 |Ti| > |F |/100, and
∑∞
i=j+1 |Ti| > |F |/100,
then the first prover gets caught with constant probability 1
4.2·107 , generated from a (
1
1.2·106 , 2) bad set.
Proof. Let Tup = ∪j−1i=0Ti, Tdown = ∪∞i=j+1Ti. Note that any clause from Tup at least 2-damages
any clause in Tdown. Take D = ∪cup∈Tup{{cup} × Tdown × {vmax(cup)} × V }. Note that |Tdown| >
0.98M/100 > M/200, and as Tup ⊂ F , we have U(Tup) ≥ 0.98W˜400 ≥ W˜500 , and thus
Pr(D) ≥ 1
4NMW˜
|Tdown|N W˜
1500
≥ 1
1.2 · 106
D Proofs for Lemmas 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8
The proofs in this appendix are very similar and very easy. We recall some definitions, then state the
lemmas. Define Si = {c ∈ C : WA2i+1 ≤ A(c) < WA2i }. For a set S ⊂ C, let W (S) = Σc∈SA(c).
Lemma 4.6. If NMW˜ < 100MWAWB and there exists an index i such that
i−1∑
j=0
W (Sj) > γ10
−4WA
∧ ∞∑
j=i+1
|Sj| > γ10−4M
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then Alice is caught cheating with probability γ
2
2.6·1012 , generated from a (
γ2
7.4·1010 , 2) bad set.
Proof. Let Sup = ∪i−1j=0Sj, Sdown = ∪∞j=i+1Sj. Let D = ∪c∈Sup ∪v∈c {c} × Sdown × {v} × V . Every
(y, y˜, x, x˜) ∈ D is 2-damaged by Alice. On the other hand,
Pr(y, y˜, x, x˜|k)
(2)
≥ (A(y) +A(y˜))(B(x) +B(x˜))
22MWAWB + 2NMW˜
≥ A(y)B(x˜)
22MWAWB + 2NMW˜
≥ A(y)B(x˜)
222MWAWB
Summing this over D gives
Pr(D) ≥
∑
y∈Sup
∑
x∈y
∑
y˜∈Sdown
∑
x˜∈V
A(y)B(x˜)
222MWAWB
≥
∑
y∈Sup
3 · 10−4γMWBA(y)
222MWAWB
≥ 3γ
2WA
222 · 108WA ≥
γ2
7.4 · 1010
Lemma 4.6. If NMW˜ < 100MWAWB and the second condition of Lemma 4.6 does not hold, then
there exists an index i such that for F = Si ∪ Si+1 we have |F | ≥ (1 − 0.0002γ)M
∧
W (F ) ≥ (1 −
0.0002γ)WA
∧ ∀c ∈ F : A(c) ≥ WA5M .
Proof. Choose t to be the smallest index for which the first half of the condition does hold, i.e.,∑t−1
j=0W (Sj) > γ10
−4WA. Then the second half of the condition cannot hold, i.e.
∞∑
j=t+1
|Sj | ≤ γ10−4M
Take i = t− 1 (note that t 6= 0 because otherwise the first half of the condition does not hold). So:
|Si|+ |Si+1| =M −
i−1∑
j=0
|Sj| −
∞∑
j=i+2
|Sj | ≥M −
i−1∑
j=0
|Sj| − γ10−4M ≥M − γ10−4M − γ10−4M
where the last inequality follows since the total weight
∑i−1
j=0W (Sj) < γ10
−4WA, but each clause in
the Sjs contributes at least 2
−iWA to W (Sj) while each clause outside of the Sjs contributes at most
2−i−1WA. A similar argument now applies to the weight W (Si) +W (Si+1). Finally, for each c ∈ F we
have
A(c) ≥ W (F )
4|F | ≥
(1− 0.0002γ)WA
4M
≥ WA
5M
Remember Si: Ti =
{
v ∈ V : WB
2i+1
≤ B(v) < WB
2i
}
. We now prove
Lemma 4.8. Either Bob gets caught cheating with probability γ
2
3.9·1012 which is generated from a
γ2
1.1·1011 , 2
bad set, or else there exists an index i such that for G = Ti ∪ Ti+1 we have |G| > (1 − 0.0002γ)N ,
Σv∈GB(v) ≥ (1− 0.0002γ)WB and for each v ∈ G, B(v) ≥ WB5N .
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Proof. If no such index exists then there is a separating index i such that letting Tup = ∪i−1j=0Sj,
Tdown = ∪∞j=i+1Sj, we have
∑
v∈Tup B(v) > 10
−4γWB, |Tdown| > 10−4γN . Let D = ∪v∈Tup ∪c:v∈c {c} ×
C × {v} × Tdown.
Pr(D : k) ≥
∑
(y,x,y˜,x˜)
A(y˜)B(x)
222MWAWB
≥
∑
x∈Tup
γNWAB(x)
222MWAWB
≥ γ
2NWB
2.22 · 1010MWA ≥
γ2M
1.1 · 1011M =
γ2
1.1 · 1011
where we used the fact that each variable appears in the formula 5 times.
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